Family Law - Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1945-1946 by Chicago-Kent Law Review
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 6 
December 1946 
Family Law - Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1945-1946 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Family Law - Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1945-1946, 25 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
47 (1946). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol25/iss1/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-195-1916
had lost the advantage of his prior service, could not be sentenced
nunc pro tunc, and could obtain relief, if at all, only through the
offices of the Division of Correction.
3 7
There is intimation in the case of United States ex rel Mazy v.
Ragen 5 that there is no necessity to impanel a jury to ascertain
whether a convicted person has been restored to sanity, he having
been previously found to be insane, before proceeding with sen-
tence. As the writ of habeas corpus there sought was denied for
failure to exhaust state remedies, the statement may be regarded
as dictum. The imputation, however, would seem to conflict with
the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Scott
39
where it was indicated that, in the absence of specific provision in
the statute,40 jury trial on the question of restoration to sanity was
a necessary corollary to trial by jury to determine insanity in the
first instance.
V. FAMILY LAW
Since the legislature first acted in 1861, the emancipation of
the married woman has gone steadily forward until today she
occupies virtually the same position as a feme sole. Some restric-
tions, however, still remain to hamper her freedom. One of these,
as pointed out by the case of People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,' is that
a married woman cannot continue to use her maiden name for
purposes of voting after marriage but, upon marriage, must regis-
ter anew under her husband's name in order to retain her right to
vote. The Appellate Court found the provisions of the Election
Code in this respect to be mandatory and not discretionary in
character. 2 It has generally been assumed that one could change a
37 The court distinguished the case of Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 760,
220 S. W. 1045 (1920), on the ground that the sentence there concerned was not
imposed under an unconstitutional statute nor was it an indeterminate one.
38 149 F. (2d) 948 (1945), reversing 55 F. Supp. 143 (1944).
39326 Ii1. 327, 157 N. E. 247 (1927).
40 InI. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 593.
1327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N. E. (2d) 642 (1945), cause transferred 390 Ill. 70, 60
N. E. (2d) 422 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 46, § 6-54.
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name at will, without seeking the approbation of a court,3 or con-
tinue to use a maiden name even thbugh married, but under the
ruling in the instant case this assumption no longer holds good for
all purposes. 4 Whether or not the public interest is benefited by
such a ruling is doubtful. 5
The subject of divorce and matters incident thereto, as usual,
make up the bulk of the cases involving aspects of family law.
One issue, in this connection, concerned the power of the trial
court, after the term had passed, to modify an alimony decree
calling for alimony in gross. About five months after the decree
had been handed down in Recklein v. Recklein,6 providing for a
conveyance to the plaintiff of the defendant's interest in certain
realty in lieu of any and all alimony, the defendant petitioned the
court to modify the same, stating that prior to the divorce pro-
ceedings the parties had entered into an agreement touching the
real estate covered by the decree, which agreement differed from
the terms of the decree. The lower court granted the modification
requested but, on appeal, the Appellate Court reversed, holding
that an alimony decree of this nature was the same as one for the
award of a sum of money in gross for and in lieu of alimony and,
once the term of court in which the decree was granted had passed,
such decree had become final.
7
The principle that a court has no power to render a valid per-
sonal decree calling for the payment of alimony where the defend-
ant is outside the jurisdiction and has been served only by publica-
tion is well-known." But constructive service of process against a
non-resident defendant in an in rem proceeding against or involv-
3In Reinken v. Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N. E. 639 (1933), the court ruled that
one could change his name without proceeding under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 96,
§§1-3.
4Rule 59A of the Illinois Supreme Court, Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann. Stat., Ch. 110,
§ 259.59A, adopted March 19, 1946, now forbids the changing of name on the Roll
of Attorneys except in case of change of name by marriage.
5 See a rather humorous comment on the subject of change of name in 27 Chicago
B. Rec. 221.
6 327 Il1. App. 641, 64 N. E. (2d) 787 (1946).
7 The finality of alimony decrees, where sums of money in gross are involved,
had previously been recognized in Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N. E. 85 (1929),
Maginnis v. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113, 153 N. E. 654 (1926), and Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill.
19, 31 N. E. 109, 19 L. R. A. 811, 34 Am. St. Rep. 56 (1892).
8 Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147 N. E. 659 (1925).
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ing specific property of the defendant located within the jurisdic-
tion is valid and empowers the court to render a binding judgment
or decree as to such property.9 The decision in the case of Mow-rey
v. Mowrey,'0 by combining these principles, has seemingly opened
a new avenue to insure the collection of alimony from a non-
resident defendant in holding that the defendant-husband there
involved had such a property right in his position and the wages
accruing therefrom as to make such property the subject of
sequestration. The Appellate Court there affirmed an order, en-
tered upon the employer located within the jurisdiction and joined
as a party defendant, directing that it withhold payment of a
portion of the wages due and to become due to the non-resident
defendant, then accumulate the same, and eventually pay over
such fund to the plaintiff for support of her minor children and
her attorney's fees. The fact that the order was in the alternative,
operating on the employer only in the event of a failure on the part
of the husband to pay the stated sum within a specific period, did
not apparently deprive it of its character as an order in rem.
Where the property proceeded against is in esse and is located
within the jurisdiction, the right to sequester is recognized,11 but
whether the doctrine can be validly applied to wages yet to be
earned and to become due, on the theory that the employee has a
property right in his job and its avails which can be seized by a
court of equity, is a matter of some doubt. A court of equity, by
sequestration, would seem to be able to do no more than could be
accomplished by garnishment, attachment or execution.
12
The scope of the inquiry when a court is petitioned by either
party to a divorce decree for a modification of the alimony provi-
sions has been the subject of much discussion. The case of Jacobs
v. Jacobs93 now indicates that a change in the financial status of
the parties produced by recent amendments to the federal income
9 Martin v. Schillo, 389 Iii. 607, 60 N. E. (2d) 392 (1945) ; Manning v. Mercantile
Securities Co., 242 Il1. 584, 90 N. E. 238, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725 (1909). See also
ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 11, § 1, and Ch. 22, § 42.
10328 Ill. App. 92, 65 N. E. (2d) 234 (1946), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Ravitm 350. Friend, P.J., dissented.
11 Wightman v. Wightman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867).
12 See discussion in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RvIEW 350, particularly p. 354.
21 328 11. App. 133, 65 N. E. (2d) 588 (1946).
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tax laws may be urged as a valid ground for alimony modification.
When reversing the holding of the trial court which had denied
modification, the Appellate Court took the view that the court
rendering an alimony decree must have had in mind the net balance
which would remain in the hands of the alimony recipient after
tax payments. It therefore felt that any subsequent change in the
income tax laws measurably affecting this net amount should be
offset, as far as equitably possible, by an increase in the amount
called for by the decree. That view appears reasonable in the
light of prior cases defining the circumstances under which alimony
provisions may be properly modified.14
The question of the validity of a Nevada divorce was presented
once again to the Illinois Supreme Court in Atkins v. Atkins. 5
The court reaffirmed its previously announced position 6 despite
an order of the Supreme Court of the United States which had
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further considera-
tion of the problem17 in the light of the recent decisions of the
higher court, particularly that announced in Esenwein v. Common-
wealth of Pensylvania.18 The Illinois Supreme Court, upholding
its prior decision denying recognition to the Nevada divorce,
pointed out that proof of an immediate change of domicile from
the jurisdiction where the decree was granted was not "the only
means by which bad faith in the establishment of the domicile in
such state may be shown."' 9 Although the appellant now came
armed with affidavits to support his contention of good faith in
the establishment of the Nevada domicile, the court held that it
was obliged to confine itself to the evidence incorporated into the
record made in the trial court.20 That evidence, in the opinion of
14 Felton v. Felton, 326 Ill. App. 444, 62 N. E. (2d) 39 (1945); McVeigh v.
McConnell, 313 Ill. App. 75, 38 N. E. (2d) 962 (1942).
15 393 Ill. 202, 65 N. E. (2d) 801 (1946).
16 Atkins v. Atkins, 386 I1. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944).
,17 Atkins v. Atkins, - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 20,90 L. Ed. (adv.) 29 (1945).
is 325 U. S. 279, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608 (1945).
19 393 Ii. 202 at 210, 65 N. E. (2d) 801 at 805.
20 While Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 216, purports to permit the reviewing
court, in its discretion, to permit the taking of further testimony, the case of
Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 376 Il1. 183, 33 N. E. (2d) 485 (1941),
indicates that such practice is unconstitutional as an attempt to enlarge the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the appellate tribunals.
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the court, failed to establish good faith on appellant's part in
acquiring a Nevada domicile, so the courts of that state lacked
jurisdiction, thereby depriving the decree of any foundation to
compel its recognition elsewhere under the full faith and credit
clause.
Judging by the widespread nature of the discussion which
they evoked, the two most significant cases which arose during the
period of this survey were the companion cases entitled Daily v.
Parker. One of them was an action brought on behalf of the Daily
children for enticing away their father and so depriving them of
his comfort, society and support.2 1 The other was an action by the
wife for alienation of affections.2 2 In the former, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that an action may be
maintained by a minor child against one who has, by enticement,
taken from the child the comfort, society and support of its father
thereby creating what clearly seems to be a new cause of action.
No case asserting the existence of such a right has ever been pre-
sented to an Illinois court, but the absence of precedent was not
regarded as enough to indicate that no such right existed. Pur-
porting to find support for its position in the Illinois Constitution
itself,23 the court said that, in the absence of an express denial of
a right of action in the decisions of the state court, the federal
court was "free to take the course which sound judgment de-
mands. ",24
In the wife's case, dismissal of the action was sought on the
ground that it was prohibited by statute.25 The United States
District Court, pointing out that the Illinois legislature had not
abolished the action but had merely made the maintenance of suits
21 152 F. (2d) 174 (1945). Jurisdiction in the federal court rested on diversity
of citizenship. As the case was settled after announcement of the decision, no
further review will occur. The case has been discussed in 26 Bost. L. Rev. 402,
46 Col. L. Rev. 464, 15 Ford. L. Rev. 126, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 30 Minn. L. Rev.
3I, 21 Notre Dame Law. 374, 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 437, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 375,
19 So. Cal. L. Rev. 455, 20 Temple L. Q. 146, and 32 Va. L. Rev. 420. A further
note is appended herein, post p. -.
2261 F. Supp. 701 (1945), noted in 34 Ill. B. J. 397, 14 Kas. City L. J. 59, 13 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 375.
23 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
24 152 F. (2d) 174 at 177.
25 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, §§ 246.1 and 246.2.
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thereon unlawful, held that the remaining sections of the so-called
"Heart Balm" act 26 were unconstitutional and constituted no bar
to the maintenance of an action for alienation of affections.
Reliance was again placed on the same constitutional provision.
27
Subsequent thereto, although not technically within the period of
this survey, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Heck v. Schupp,28 came
to the same conclusion on the same statute and for much the same
reasons. The bar may look for a flood of litigation of this charac-
ter if current newspaper reports are any indication of what lies
ahead.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
While nothing more of consequence has been said with respect
to the creation or operation of future interests in land, some deci-
sions affecting other aspects of the real property law are worthy
of note. Defeasible estates in fee simple are not common, but
where they are found it is important to catalog them carefully
with respect to whether the defeasible estate is one upon a condi-
tional limitation, sometimes called a fee simple determinable, or
is an estate upon a condition subsequent. That fact is emphasized
by the decision in Storke w. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company'
where an attempt was made to secure partition of a parcel of real
estate based on the claim that a deed made some sixty years ago,
affecting a sizeable area of valuable land in Chicago, had con-
veyed only a fee simple determinable estate which had automati-
cally reverted to the heirs of the grantors upon breach of a
covenant against the sale of intoxicating liquor. While the deed
itself recited that in case of breach "said premises shall imme-
diately revert to the grantors," the court found that the covenant
therein operated merely as a condition subsequent, that no right
2a The case of People v. Mahumed, 381 Il. 81, 44 N. E. (2d) 911 (1942), had
declared Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, §§ 246.3 and 246.5, uncbnstitutional.
27 IR. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
28 394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 464 (1946).
1390 Ill. 619, 61 N. E. (2d) 552 (1945).
